Exploring cross-domain & cross-forest RBCD part 2#2457
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🔗 Additional ContextOriginal Blog Post: https://synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploring-cross-domain-cross-forest-rbcd-part-2.html Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "Windows Hardening > Active Directory Methodology > Resource-based Constrained Delegation; also cross-reference Windows Hardening > Active Directory Methodology > Kerberos Authentication". Repository Maintenance:
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Synacktiv extends Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) exploitation to multi-domain and cross-forest Active Directory environments. The post shows that Kerberos S4U delegation can be recursively chained through parent-child domain trust paths so that a controlled delegating principal, such as a machine account or an SPN-less user, can impersonate any delegable user in its own forest and then access resources in the same forest or in a trusted remote forest, as long as th...
🔧 Technical Details
Recursive cross-domain S4U2Self impersonation. In a multi-domain Active Directory forest, a controlled delegating principal can impersonate a user from another domain by following Kerberos referral paths. The first S4U2Self is sent to the impersonated user's domain, intermediate parent-child domains are traversed with
TGS-REQrequests forkrbtgt/<realm>, and the final S4U2Self is sent to the attacker's own domain. Each ticket returned by one hop is reused as the TGT for the next hop and carries the impersonated user's PAC. This enables attacks where a machine account holding only a TGT can obtain a usable service ticket as a privileged user from another domain, for example by requesting S4U2Self withgetST.py -k -no-pass -impersonate user@domain -self -altservice cifs/hostand then accessing SMB withsmbclient.py -k -no-pass.SPN-less S4U2Self+U2U fallback. A normal user without an SPN ...
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Reconfirmed:
## ReferencessectionNo further edits are justified from the current context.
I’m still withholding the final summary until you explicitly ask for it.
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